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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
national commerce. It is clear that even though he derived sub-
stantial revenue from interstate or international commerce under
the Gillnore test, he would nevertheless not be "generally equipped
to handle litigation away from his business location." 51
Conclusion
Seemingly, CPLR 302(a) (3) will withstand constitutional
objections in principle, if not in all applications, as one authority
has noted. 52 Probably most difficulty will arise with respect to
302 (a) (3) (ii). However, even that subsection may withstand
constitutional attack in a proper case. For example, if suit is
brought in New York against a large nation-wide manufacturer
whose activities in and revenue derived from New York are not
sufficient to meet the requirements of 302 (a) (3) (i), but whose
revenue is largely derived from interstate and international com-
merce, an application of 302(a) (3) (ii) would probably be allowed
to stand. It is almost certain that if (ii) encounters its first
constitutional test in a case presenting facts similar to the surfboard
hypothetical, it will fail. If 302(a) (3) (ii) is to withstand all
constitutional objections it must either be construed by the courts
of New York so as to meet due process requirements or it must
be amended by the legislature.
Until there is a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality
of obtaining jurisdiction over a non-resident for tortious acts out-
side the state causing injury within the state, the constitutional
status of 302(a) (3) will remain uncertain.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Situs of injury in unfair competition action is
where plaintiff lost business.
Aside from the substantial revenue conundrum of CPLR
302(a) (3) discussed above, there has been a most recent develop-
ment in another requirement of 302(a) (3) long-arm jurisdiction,
51Id. One source has noted that 302(a)(3)(ii) could raise a consti-
tutional question under the commerce clause if it placed an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long Arm
Statute, 16 BUFFAwO L. Rnv. 67, 79 (1966). However, since an activity
that would give rise to the cause of action occurred within the state,
i.e., the injury, this factor would seem to prevent an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Juris-
diction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 986 (1960). Since the cases on commerce
clause limitations of jurisdiction proscribe only oppressive and unreasonable
burdens, the public interest favors a correlative duty on one who enjoys
large scale access and operations in interstate or international commerce
to appear, in certain situations, in the forum of the tort victim to litigate
a claim. Homburger & Laufer, supra at 79-80.52 Homburger & Laufer, supra note 51, at 76.
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
namely, whether the injury has occurred in New York. In Spec-
tacular Pronw ions, Inc. v. Radio Station WING,5 3 plaintiff was
a national publicity firm with offices in New York. It alleged
unfair competition by the defendant, an Ohio resident not doing
business in New York, for altering one of plaintiff's announce-
ments and broadcasting it in Ohio for a competitor's benefit.
In ascertaining the most reasonable and fair locus of injury
for jurisdictional purposes, the court emphasized the foreseeability
test of CPLR 302(a)(3) and posed three possible forums for
trial of the unfair competition action: the plaintiff's principal place
of business, any place the plaintiff does business, and the place
where the business was lost. The first possibility was rejected
because of the absence of a predictable relationship between the
principal place of business and defendant's tortious act.54 As to
the second possibility, the court observed that a large national
corporation should not be entitled to sue in any state in which
it does business. Granting such latitude to plaintiff, stressed the
court, would obviously be unfair to the defendant.
The court adopted the businessman's concept of injury, and
concluded that the place where one loses customers is the most
foreseeable forum for suit in an unfair competition action. At
this situs there would be a reasonable relation between the defend-
ant and the nation-wide plaintiff corporation. It would be here
that all the critical events took place and here there would be
minimum contacts by the defendant to satisfy the Hanson v. Den-
ckla requirements.5 5 The court, in conclusion, analogized plaintiff
to "a man with his trunk and head in one state and his limbs
and fingers spread over many others. If one finger is bruised,
the whole body-including each of the fingers-is weakened. Most
would agree, however, that the injury is localized in one finger." 5r
ARTICLE 6- JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION
AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 602: No consolidation or joint trial of actions for personal
injuries and declaratory judgment of non-coverage.
CPLR 602(a) gives the court discretion to grant a motion
for joint trial of any or all matters in issue where the pending
actions involve a common question of law or fact. This provision
is primarily designed to avoid the danger of divergent decisions
on a similar issue.
5 272 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
541d. at 737.
55357 U.S. 235 (1958).
6 Spectacular Promotions, Inc., v. Radio Station WING, 272 F. Supp.
734, 737 (ED.N.Y. 1967).
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